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Abstract
In this paper, we study consumption decisions under risk assuming
a prioritarian social welfare function, namely a concave transformation
of individual utility functions. Under standard assumptions, there is
always more current consumption under ex ante prioritarianism than
under utilitarianism. Thus, a concern for equity (in the ex ante prioritarian sense) means less concern for the risky future. In contrast,
there is usually less current consumption under ex post prioritarianism
than under utilitarianism. We discuss the robustness of these results
to learning, and to other forms of prioritarian social welfare functions.
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Introduction

In this paper, we examine the implications for consumption under risk of
using a prioritarian social welfare function (SWF) of the form
P
(( ))
(1)


where ( ) is the utility function of consumption  in period , and where
() is strictly increasing and strictly concave. More precisely, we derive
interpretable conditions so that there is more or less consumption under
prioritarianism as compared to utilitarianism (i.e., the case where  is linear).
The concept of prioritarianism has its roots in contemporary philosophy
(Parfit 1991, Nagel 1995). Essentially, prioritarianism means that one must
give priority to the less well oﬀ. While a utilitarian social planner maximizes
the sum of utilities and is thus indiﬀerent to the distribution of utilities, a
prioritarian social planner maximizes the sum of a strictly concave transformation () of utilities, and thus gives greater priority to welfare changes
aﬀecting relatively worse-oﬀ individuals.1 In economics, the form (1) has
been extensively used in social choice and in the optimal taxation literature
(Sen 1970, Kaplow 2008). It is also sometimes used in policy evaluation when
“distributional weights” capture the nonlinearity in  and in  (Drèze and
Stern 1987, Johansson-Stenman 2005, Adler 2013).
The use of a prioritarian SWF has an interesting moral dimension for
the choice between risky prospects. Indeed, one can distinguish between ex
ante and ex post prioritarianism. The ex ante prioritarian social planner
maximizes the sum of transformed expected utilities, while the ex post prioritarian social planner maximizes the expectation of the sum of transformed
utilities. As a result, the ex post prioritarian social planner cares about the
diﬀerence in realized utilities ex post, once the risk is resolved. In contrast,
the ex ante prioritarian social planner cares about the diﬀerence in expected
1

In particular, unlike utilitarianism, prioritarianism leads to a strict preference for a
mean-preserving contraction of utilities. In other words, a prioritarian SWF satisfies the
Pigou-Dalton axiom: a non-leaky, non-rank-switching transfer of utility from someone at
a higher utility level to someone at a lower level should be seen as an improvement. The
other axioms leading to (1) are Pareto, anonymity, continuity and separability. See Adler
(2012) for an extensive discussion of prioritarianism. Note that there exists an axiomatic
foundation to prioritarianism based on an extension of Harsanyi’s utilitarian impartial
observer theorem, and coined “generalized utilitarianism” (Grant et al. 2010). For a
criticism of prioritarianism, see for instance Harsanyi (1975) and Broome (1991).
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utilities ex ante, before the risk is resolved. The choice between the ex ante
and ex post criteria and its moral implications have been discussed in the
literature (Diamond 1967, Broome 1984, Fleurbaey 2010, Adler 2012, Fleurbaey and Bovens 2012). However, the economic and policy implications of
this choice have not been thoroughly examined.2
Our results are relevant for the debate about climate policy. One important issue in this debate concerns intergenerational equity. Risk is a second
important issue. Very often however, these issues have been treated independently in the climate change literature. And when treated simultaneously, a
utilitarian SWF has usually been assumed both in the theoretical and numerical literature (Stern 2007, Dasgupta 2008, Nordhaus 2008, Weitzman
2008, Gollier 2012).3
In this paper, we want to stress the importance and the richness of the ex
ante/ex post approach for economic problems that combine risk and equity
dimensions. To do so, we consider a simple consumption model, often known
as the cake eating problem (see section 2). The model can be interpreted
as follows. A social planner must split a cake among diﬀerent agents who
come sequentially (e.g., among diﬀerent generations). Under certainty, the
problem is trivial, and the cake is equally shared (because the agents are
identical). But the problem is that the size of the cake is unknown. If the
social planner is prioritarian rather than utilitarian, should he give more or
less of the cake to the first agent, given that the remaining portion of the
cake is unknown?
The main result of the paper is that the answer depends sensitively on
whether the social planner uses an ex ante or an ex post prioritarian approach. The social planner should give more to the first agent under ex ante
prioritarianism than under utilitarianism (see section 3), but less under ex
post prioritarianism than under utilitarianism (see section 4). We show that
this result is robust to a situation in which the social planner learns the size
of the cake after the first decision has been made (see section 5). Finally,
we discuss whether this result is robust to other forms of prioritarianism
(see section 6). In particular, we derive a simple condition so that there is
always less consumption under “transformed” ex post prioritarianism than
2

Exceptions include Ulph (1982), Fleurbaey and Bovens (2012) and Adler, Hammitt
and Treich (2014), all in the context of mortality risk policies.
3
Exceptions include Johansson-Stenman (2000), Ha Duong and Treich (2004), Bommier
and Zuber (2008), Roemer (2008), Traeger (2012), Dietz and Asheim (2012) and Fleurbaey
and Zuber (2013).
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under utilitarianism. We also consider Fleurbaey (2010)’s equally distributed equivalent setting, and exhibit a case where consumption is equal to
that under utilitarianism in this setting.
Our results depend on some restrictions on the form of the von Neumann
Morgernstern (vNM) utility function () and on the form of the prioritarian
SWF through (). These two functions () and () have very diﬀerent
interpretations, as the former captures the risk preferences of the individuals living in the society while the latter captures the moral preferences of
the society. We assume throughout that the vNM utility function () is
the same for every individual–thereby avoiding the thorny question of how
diﬀerent vNM functions might be compared across individuals (Dhillon and
Mertens 1999). Moreover, we assume that this common vNM function is
also a measure of interpersonally comparable well-being. The assumption
of a linear correspondence between vNM utility and well-being is known as
the “Bernoulli” assumption and has long been a controversial assumption in
social choice (Arrow 1951). Still, both of the assumptions described here are
the prevalent assumptions in the applied literature using SWFs, and provide
a natural starting point for rigorous analysis.

2

A simple consumption model

It will be convenient in the following to use the terminology of the precautionary savings literature. We consider two periods, and assume that the
utility function  is identical across the two periods, with  strictly increasing, strictly concave and thrice diﬀerentiable. The main objective of our
analysis is to compare levels of consumption in the first period across three
diﬀerent objectives, namely utilitarianism, ex ante and ex post prioritarianism. Under utilitarianism, the optimal consumption in the first period,
denoted   is defined by
e − )
 = arg max () + (


(2)

where 
e is a random variable representing risk over the size of the “cake”,
namely the risk over lifetime wealth in the standard precautionary savings
e 4 Since utility is
model. We denote inf  0 the smallest realization of .
4

In this model, it is standard to make sure that the cake cannot be fully consumed
before the final period, i.e.   inf . For instance, in a precautionary savings model, it
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strictly increasing, we have directly introduced into the optimization program
the fact that the cake will be fully consumed.
The first order condition (FOC) of this program gives5
0 ( ) − 0 (
e −  ) = 0

(3)

Observe that we assume that the utility function () is the same in both
periods, and that there is no discounting. Thus, the only source of heterogeneity across the two periods comes from the risk over the size of the
cake which makes second-period consumption risky. Assuming no discounting throughout will ensure that the utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs respect
anonymity.
It is well known from the precautionary savings literature that current
consumption is reduced under risk, i.e.  ≤ 2  if and only if (iﬀ) the
decision maker is “prudent” 000 ≥ 0 (Leland 1968, Kimball 1990).6 Indeed,
under prudence, the marginal utility of wealth is higher under risk, and
thus it makes sense to transfer more wealth into the future when the risk
will be faced. Note that the restriction 000  0 is necessary for the common
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) hypothesis, and is usually accepted
in the risk theory literature (Gollier 2001).

3

Ex ante prioritarianism

Under ex ante prioritarianism (EAP), optimal consumption is defined by
 = arg max (()) + ((
e − ))


(4)

where  is strictly increasing, strictly concave and thrice diﬀerentiable. Note
that the decision maker maximizes the sum of transformed expected utilities,
consistent with an ex ante approach. The optimal level of consumption is
characterized by the following FOC:
 ( ) ≡  0 (( ))0 ( ) − 0 ((
e −  ))0 (
e −  ) = 0 (5)

is typically assumed that the constraint that the agent cannot borrow against more than
the minimum value of lifetime wealth is never binding (Kimball 1990, Gollier 2001). Note
that the assumption 0 (0) = +∞ is suﬃcient to ensure that this is always the case.
5
Second order conditions will be satisfied throughout the paper, except when explicitly
mentioned.
6
Technically, the result holds iﬀ 0 (
e − ) ≥ 0 ( 
e − ) for all ,
e namely iﬀ marginal
utility is convex by Jensen inequality.
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There is more consumption under EAP than under utilitarianism, i.e.  ≥
  or equivalently ( ) ≥ 0 which by using (3) holds iﬀ
( ) ≤ (
e −  )

(6)

This leads to the following result. (All the Propositions in this paper should
be understood as stating results which hold true for every level of wealth .
This is a key assumption for the necessary conditions stated in the Propositions.)
Proposition 1 There is more consumption under EAP than under utilitarianism iﬀ  is DARA, i.e.
000 ()
−00 ()
≥

−00 ()
0 ()

Proof: Under DARA, −0 is more risk averse than . Namely, we have
 = (−0 ) with  strictly increasing and convex. This leads to
(
e −  ) =
≥
=
=

(−0 (
e −  ))
e −  ))
(−0 (
(−0 ( ))
( )

which proves the inequality above. We now show the necessity. If  is not
DARA, then  is locally concave, and the above inequality can be reversed
for a well chosen .
e Therefore, consumption under EAP can be lower than
under utilitarianism. Q.E.D
The intuition for this result may be presented as follows. Assuming utilitarianism, under DARA (and thus under prudence) the reduction in current
consumption due to risk implies that the future expected utility is greater
than the current utility (see (6)). This in turn gives the ex ante prioritarian social planner an incentive to increase first period consumption, thereby
reducing the diﬀerence between current and future expected utility. Hence,
this result shows that under a standard assumption on the utility function,
prioritarianism leads to more, and not less, current consumption.7 In other
7

Since there is more consumption under EAP than under utilitarianism, one may wonder whether it is possible that there is more consumption under EAP than under certainty
(under either utilitarianism or prioritarianism). It is straightforward to show that this is
never the case under 000 ≥ 0, and that there is thus always precautionary savings.
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words, this result indicates that a concern for equity (in the EAP sense)
means less concern for the risky future. The view of ex ante fairness as socially desirable is widespread in the literature (Diamond 1967, Epstein and
Segal 1991). Our model thus illustrates a surprising implication of this view.
Note also that under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), we have

( ) = (
e −  ) leading to  =  and thus to ( ) = (
e−


). Namely, under the common CARA utility function, the (expected)
utilities are equal across the two periods both under utilitarianism and under
prioritarianism.
We finally add a comment about the scaling of the vNM utility function (). Under expected utility, it is well known that the utility function
is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation. In the standard precautionary savings model under utilitarianism (2), a change from () to some
other ∗ () = () +  with   0 does not change the amount of current
consumption. However, under prioritarianism, this is no longer true. For a
given () in the SWF, the amount of consumption under EAP may diﬀer
after such an aﬃne transformation. Yet, since DARA is preserved under any
aﬃne transformation, the result of Proposition 1 is also preserved. Namely,
for any given (), and for any given () that is DARA, first-period consumption under EAP is greater than under utilitarianism both under ()
and for every positive aﬃne rescaling of ().
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Ex post prioritarianism

Under ex post prioritarianism (EPP), optimal consumption is defined by
e − ))
  = arg max (()) + ((


(7)

Note that the decision maker now maximizes the expectation of transformed
utilities, consistent with an ex post approach. The FOC is given by
e −   ))0 (
e −   ) = 0 (8)
(  ) ≡  0 ((  ))0 (  ) − 0 ((

There is less consumption under EPP than under EAP iﬀ ( ) ≤ 0. In
the following Proposition, we derive a suﬃcient condition for this inequality.
Proposition 2 There is less consumption under EPP than under EAP when
000 ≥ 0.
7

Proof: Let 
e −  ≡ e. Then observe that ( ) ≤ 0 iﬀ
 ))0 (e
 ) ≤  0 ((e
 ))0 (e
 )
 0 ((e

 ))0 (e
 ) =  0 ((e
 ))0 (e
 ) + (0 ((e
 )) 0 (e
 )),
Observe now that  0 ((e
0
0
and since  (()) and  () are both decreasing in , the covariance term is
positive. Therefore the result holds if 0 ((e
 )) ≤ 0 ((e
 )) which is the
000
case iﬀ  ≥ 0 by Jensen inequality. Q.E.D.
Note that the result only requires a restriction of the third derivative of
the function () with no restriction on (). Thus, this result is not aﬀected
by the scaling of the utility function.
Is the restriction  000 ≥ 0 plausible? At a minimum, this restriction is
surely more plausible than the opposite  000  0. In fact, it can be shown that
if  0 ()  0 and  00 ()  0 and if 000 () has the same sign for all   0, then it
must be that 000 ()  0 (Menegatti 2001). Indeed a positive, decreasing and
concave 0 would have to cross the origin at some point (thus contradicting
0  0), as illustrated in Figure 1. Note that the standard Atkinsonian
function, i.e. () = (1 − )−1 1− with   0 and   0 (and () = log 
for  = 1), displays 000  0. Another standard prioritarian transformation
function is the negative exponential function, i.e. () = −− , which also
displays 000  0.
 INSERT FIGURE 1 
Thus, under commonly used SWFs, there is less consumption under EPP
than under EAP. The next objective is to examine whether there could be less
consumption under EPP than under utilitarianism. We know the answer in
the CARA case. We saw above that if  has the CARA form, consumption
under EAP is equal to that under utilitarianism. Therefore Proposition 2
indicates that consumption under EPP is also lower than under utilitarianism
under CARA when  000 ≥ 0. But we would want to sign the comparison
between EAP and utilitarianism in the general case. The answer is given in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 There is less consumption under EPP than under utilitarianism iﬀ
000 ()
−00 ()
000 (()) 0
(9)
≤
3
+
{
} ()
−00 ()
0 ()
− 00 (())
8

Proof: Let us define () = (()). We want to examine under which
conditions we have: 0 ( )−0 (−
e  ) = 0 implies  0 ( )−0 (−
e  ) ≤ 0.
Now let −0 () = (−0 ()) with  strictly increasing and concave. Then
e −  ) =
− 0 (
≤
=
=

(−0 (
e −  ))
e −  ))
(−0 (
(−0 ( ))
− 0 ( )

Conversely, if  is locally convex, then it is possible to find a well chosen 
e so
that the inequality above is reversed. Therefore the necessary and suﬃcient
 000
000
condition is that − 0 is more concave than −0 , or −
00 ≥ −00 given that  is
itself more concave than . This condition is provided in the theorem 3.4 in
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (1994), which yields (9). Q.E.D
As shown in Table 1, our analysis so far has permitted the comparison of first-period consumption levels under utilitarianism, EAP and EPP.
Note that the comparison is unambiguous under  000 ≥ 0, except for the pair
(    ) which depends on a complex condition (9).
 CARA
 DARA
 
000



 

= ≥
if  ≥ 0 
≥ ,
≥
if  000 ≥ 0,  ≥   iﬀ (9)
Table 1: Consumption levels under utilitarianism, EAP and EPP.




Why is condition (9) so complex? Denoting () = (()), the proof
shows that the comparison between EPP and utilitarianism depends on how
a change in preference from  to  aﬀects precautionary savings. More pre00
00
cisely, it depends on whether more risk aversion, i.e. −
≤ −
, leads to
0
0
000
 000
more prudence, i.e. −00 ≤ −00 . This last implication explains why condition
(9) involves the third derivatives of both  and  as one needs to compute  000 .
Although it sounds intuitive that a more risk averse agent should be more
prudent, this is not always the case (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 1994). For
instance, one may change the degree of risk aversion of a quadratic utility
function without aﬀecting the degree of prudence.8
8

Moreover, here is an example where the condition (9) does not hold for some wealth
levels. Take () = −− and () = (1 − )−1 1− , then the condition is violated iﬀ
1
wealth is below 
b = (1 − 2) 1− .

9

The last observation illustrates that comparing consumption under EPP
and utilitarianism is formally similar to analyzing the eﬀect of more risk
aversion in a precautionary savings model. However, it is well known that
changing () in (7) is not a proper way to study the eﬀect of risk preferences
in that model (Bommier, Chassagnon and Le Grand 2012). Indeed, this
change aﬀects not only risk aversion, but also the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. In other words, this change aﬀects ordinal preferences over
certain prospects, and is not meaningful to capture a “pure” change in risk
preferences in intertemporal expected utility models.9
We now investigate whether the condition (9) is satisfied for most commonly used utility functions and SWFs. We consider the prevalent Atkinsonian SWF, i.e. () = (1 − )−1 1− with   0 and   0. In that case,
the inequality (9) reduces to
000 ()
−00 ()
0 ()
≤
3
+
(1
+
)

−00 ()
0 ()
()

(10)

Interestingly, this last inequality exhibits three diﬀerent utility curvature
coeﬃcients, namely the familiar degrees of risk aversion and of prudence, as
well as the reciprocal of the degree of fear of ruin 0 (Foncel and Treich 2005).
Take for instance a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
() = (1 − )−1 1− with  ∈ (0 1). Then the condition (9) is equivalent
to (1−)+
≥ 0, and is always satisfied under our parametric assumptions.10

We next discuss whether the comparison in condition (9) is robust to
a change in the scaling of the utility function (). This cannot be true
generically. To see this, observe that the right hand side term of (9) de 000 (())
pends directly on the function  through −
00 (()) . As a result, this side of
the equation can be arbitrarily aﬀected by an additive change from () to
9

An early approach to examine the eﬀect of risk aversion in intertemporal models
is proposed by Khilstrom and Mirman (1974). They consider a model of the form
max  −1 ([() + (
e − ))]). In this model, more risk aversion, through a more concave , decreases first period consumption (for “small risks”, see Drèze and Modigliani
1972, Bommier, Chassagnon and Le Grand 2012). A well known alternative is based on
so-called “recursive” preferences (Selden 1978, Epstein and Zin 1989), leading to the objective: max () + ( −1 (((
e − ))). A more concave () is interpreted as more risk
aversion and reduces current consumption given some specific technical restrictions on ()
and () (Kimball and Weil 2009).
10
Observe that under our parameterization we get (0) = 0 so that  = 0 can be
interpreted as a minimal subsistence level of wealth. This “zeroing out” assumption (Adler
2012) is not innocuous because the scaling of utility matters under prioritarianism.
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∗ () = () +  for some functions (), thus possibly modifying the sign
of the inequality depending on the value of . Note however
that under a
 000 (())
negative exponential SWF, i.e. () = −− , the term −
00 (()) becomes
a constant. Hence, our comparative statics results are not aﬀected by an
additive change in this case. This is not a surprise since it is well known
that the ranking of prospects is not aﬀected by such additive re-scaling under exponential SWFs (Bossert and Weymark 2004, Adler 2012). Consider
alternatively an Atkinsonian SWF. Then the comparative statics analysis
would not be aﬀected by a “ratio-rescaling” of the utility function, namely
by a multiplicative change from () to ∗ () = () with   0. To see this,
observe that none of the curvature coeﬃcients in (10) would be aﬀected by
such a multiplicative change. Again, this result is not surprising since the
Atkinsonian function is known to be the only prioritarian SWF to display
the ratio-rescaling invariance property (Bossert and Weymark 2004, Adler
2012).
Observe finally that (10) is more likely to be satisfied when the “inequity
aversion” parameter  increases. At the limit when  tends to infinity,
i.e. for a Rawlsian-type SWF, the inequality (9) is always satisfied. This
observation provides an intuition for the result. Indeed, under EPP and a
Rawlsian-type SWF, the decision maker’s objective is to increase consumption in the worst state ex post (i.e., when 
e = inf ), as soon as the utility
reached in that state is not higher than current utility. He thus essentially
chooses consumption such that () ≈ (inf − ). This tends to yield less
current consumption than under utilitarianism, given by 0 () = 0 (
e − ),
and to even less current consumption than under EAP (under a Rawlsiantype SWF), given by () ≈ (
e − ).

5

A simple model with learning

In this section, we consider a specific multi-periodic model, and we will allow
for the possibility of learning. In a three-period model, the objective under
utilitarianism becomes
e − 1 − 2 )
max (1 ) + (2 ) + (
1 2

11

Note that perfect smoothing is optimal in the early periods 1 = 2 = . The
problem of finding optimal current consumption  then becomes
 = arg max 2() + (
e − 2)

(11)

e − 2))
 = arg max 2(()) + ((

(12)



Similarly, optimal consumptions under EAP and EPP are defined by


e − 2))
  = arg max 2(()) + ((


(13)

It is easy to see then the comparison of  ,  and   leads to the
same results as in the Propositions before. Considering more (than 3) periods would not aﬀect these results provided that perfect smoothing remains
optimal in the early periods. However, the situation becomes more complex
if learning is allowed, as we now show.11
For simplicity, we assume perfect learning between periods 2 and 3. That
is, in period 2, the realization of 
e is known. Then the period 2 problem is
made under certainty, and perfect smoothing is optimal in the future either
under prioritarianism or under utilitarianism. Hence, viewed from the first
period, optimal future (risky) consumption equals
∗2 =


e − 1

2

Using obvious notations, the optimal consumption in the first period for
utilitarianism and EPP are then defined as follows (the EAP case is treated
later)

e−
)

2

e−
= arg max (()) + 2((
))

2

  = arg max () + 2(
  

Note that the eﬀect of learning under utilitarianism, and under prioritarianism, is given by comparing   to  in (11) and    to   in (13). It is
not very diﬃcult to show that learning usually increases consumption under
11

Learning is an important factor aﬀecting risk policies in general, especially for long
term problems. See for example the literature on climate change (Ulph and Ulph 1997
and Gollier, Jullien and Treich 2000).
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utilitarianism and EPP compared to the no learning (i.e., “risk”) case.12 The
intuition is that learning allows to better smooth consumption in the future,
which thus increases future expected utility. As a result, there is more early
consumption under learning because there is less need to worry about the
future (Epstein 1980, Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich 2005).
Assuming learning, we now want to compare consumption under utilitarianism and EPP, i.e.   and    . This amounts to compare precautionary
savings under () and () = (()), and this comparison is direct from previous Proposition 3. Indeed we can show that under learning, there is less
consumption under EPP than under utilitarianism iﬀ (9) holds.
The case of EAP is more diﬃcult. Indeed, viewed from the first period,

future utility equals ( −
) and is risky, which matters under EAP. Optimal
2
consumption is given by
  = arg max (()) + 2((



e−
))
2

(14)

The problem here is that the EAP criterion is time-inconsistent (Broome
1984, Adler and Sanchirico 2006). Technically, this relates to the fact that
the intertemporal utility function in (14) is not linear in probabilities (Hammond 1983, Epstein and Le Breton 1992).13 This means that, by contrast
with utilitarianism or EPP, the optimization problem over the three periods cannot be formulated recursively under EAP. To see that, consider the
second period problem. After the resolution of uncertainty, i.e. 
e = 
the EAP decision maker evaluates future social welfare in period 2 and 3
by 2(( −
)). Therefore, before the resolution of uncertainty, this decision
2
12

Let us first compare consumption under learning and under risk assuming utilitar
ianism. Under learning, the FOC is given by 0 () − 0 ( −
2 ) = 0, while under risk
0
0
it is given by  () −  (
e − 2) = 0. Thus there is more current consumption under

0
0
learning iﬀ 0 (
e − 2) ≥ 0 ( −
e − 2) = 0. Observe now
2 ) given that  () −  (
1 0
1

0
0
0 −
 (
e − 2) = 2  () + 2  (
e − 2) ≥  ( 2 ) by Jensen inequality and 000 ≥ 0.
This leads to the result that under prudence learning increases early consumption under
utilitarianism. Note then that the role of learning under EPP is similar by just replacing
 by  = () in the previous reasoning. But then observe that  000 ≥ 0 ensures  000 ≥ 0 so
the result also carries over under 000 ≥ 0 and  000 ≥ 0.
13
Note that this nonlinearity might also imply a negative value of information (Wakker
1988). But we can show that this is not the case here. Indeed the utility reached under
learning (see (14)) is always higher than the one reached under no learning (see (12)) iﬀ

1
(( −
e − 2)). This inequality always holds under  and 
2 )) ≥ 2 ((()) + ((
concave by simply applying twice the Jensen inequality.

13

maker would be time-consistent by averaging future values of social welfare

across the possible states of the world, namely by considering 2(( −
)).
2
But this does not correspond to the ex ante objective of the EAP social planner under learning, as defined in (14).14 This form of time-inconsistency can
be seen as an important drawback of EAP approach. On the other hand,
EAP respects the Pareto principle in terms of individuals’ expected utilities,
unlike EPP.
Observe now that comparing, under learning, consumption under utilitarianism and under (time-inconsistent) EAP is similar as this comparison under no learning. DARA is, again, the instrumental condition on the
utility function that drives the analysis. A sketch of the proof of this result follows. We want to compare   and  . Respective FOCs equal



0 (())0 ()−0 (( −
))0 ( −
) = 0 and 0 ()−0 ( −
) = 0. Therefore
2
2
2
−


0
we are done if we can show () ≤ ( 2 ) with  () = 0 ( −
). By a
2
similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, this holds iﬀ DARA. We
thus find that, under learning, there is more consumption under EAP than
under utilitarianism iﬀ () is DARA.
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Other prioritarian SWFs

In this section, we consider a wider range of SWFs. Since our welfare analysis focuses on utilitarianism and prioritarianism, we only examine two additional cases: “transformed utilitarianism” and “transformed EPP” (Adler,
Hammitt and Treich 2014).15 An important property is that the SWFs corresponding to these two cases are no longer separable in general.
We consider again the basic two-period model. Under transformed utili14

This observation is reminiscent of Myerson (1981)’s egalitarian-father example that
the evaluation of social welfare may depend on the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.
The example goes as follows. An egalitarian father has two children, who can become
clerk, teacher or doctor depending wether they go to college for respectively 0, 4 or 8
years. The problem is that the father can aﬀord only 8 years of college. Moreover, the
father prefers that the two children have the same situation, whereas the children prefer
a 50% chance of being clerk/doctor to being teacher for sure. Suppose that a fair coin
decides who will go to the medical school. Before the coin toss, this randomization device
Pareto-dominates the “both teachers” plan. Yet, after the coin toss, this device will seem
unegalitarian and the father prefers the “both teachers” plan.
15
The “transformed EAP” case is equivalent to EAP.
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tarianism, optimal consumption in the first period is defined by
e − )]
  = arg max [() + (


in which  is assumed to be increasing and twice diﬀerentiable. Note that if 
is nonlinear,   does not coincide in general with the optimal consumption
under plain utilitarianism, namely with  .16 In particular, we have   ≤ 
iﬀ
{0 [( ) + (
e −  )](0 ( ) − 0 (
e −  ))} ≤ 0
(15)
or equivalently iﬀ

e −  )] 0 ( ) − 0 (
e −  )) ≤ 0
(0 [( ) + (

e − )) = 0 by the definition of  . Notice that the term
since (0 ( ) −0 (
0 
0

( ( )− (− )) is always increasing in  while the term 0 [( )+(−
 )] is always decreasing in  iﬀ 0 is decreasing. Therefore the concavity
of the transformation function  is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
transformed utilitarianism to reduce first-period consumption compared to
plain utilitarianism, i.e.   ≤  .
Under transformed EPP, optimal consumption in the first period is defined by
   = arg max [(()) + ((
e − ))]


Simply observe now that the function () = (()) is also increasing and
concave under our assumptions on . As a result, we can straightforwardly
use the above reasoning to conclude that the concavity of the transformation
function  is also a necessary and suﬃcient condition for transformed EPP
to reduce current consumption compared to plain EPP, i.e.    ≤   .
Moreover, we know from the analysis above that current consumption is
lower under EPP than under utilitarianism iﬀ the condition (9) is satisfied.
We can therefore conclude that EPP, either under the plain version or under
the transformed version with  concave, leads to less current consumption
compared to utilitarianism under that same condition (9), i.e.    ≤  .
The previous observation however suggests that the comparison between
current consumption under utilitarianism and under transformed EPP is not
clear when  is convex. A case in point is the prioritarian case of Fleurbaey
16

In the following, we assume that the second order condition is always satisfied. Note
that this need not be the case if  is “suﬃciently” convex.
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(2010)’s equally distributed equivalent (EDE). Optimal consumption under
EDE is defined by
1
1
 = arg max −1 ( (()) + ((
e − )))

2
2

so that () =  −1 (2) is convex since  is concave. Following the above
observations, we know that  is greater than    which is also greater
than    with any  concave. However, we cannot use previous results to
directly compare  to  . Under EDE, the FOC is given by


e − ))0 (
e − )
 0 (())0 () − 0 ((
= 0
1
1
0
−1
 ( ( 2 (()) + 2 ((
e − ))))

(16)

Using (16), we derive in the appendix the necessary and suﬃcient condition
to compare  and  when 
e is “small” in the sense of a second order
approximation. This condition takes the form of an inequality which is always
equal to zero under Atkinsonian and CRRA utility functions. In other words,
we have  =  under this set of assumptions. This suggests that this
special type of ex post approach introduced by Fleurbaey (2010) can be
viewed as a limit case of “transformed EPP” leading to the same consumption
level as under utilitarianism.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined a simple consumption model under risk with
a prioritarian social welfare function. We have shown that, under standard
assumptions on utility and social welfare functions, prioritarianism always
leads to more current consumption under an ex ante approach, but to less
current consumption under an ex post approach, than under utilitarianism.
These standard assumptions include the familiar constant relative risk aversion utility and Atkinsonian social welfare functions.
Why is this result interesting? Many economic problems combine a risk
and an equity dimension. Consider the general idea that the risk of future
climate change justifies less consumption of energy today. The traditional
argument in the economics of discounting under utilitarianism relies on a
precautionary savings motive (see, e.g., the “precautionary eﬀect” in Gollier
2012, p. 50). Our paper shows that this argument is reinforced by a moral
16

prioritarian argument only under the ex post approach, but is weakened
under the ex ante approach.
We conclude by presenting a few possible extensions. These extensions
could make our approach more relevant to an applied problem such as climate change. As in the climate discounting literature (Weitzman 2009, Millner 2013), we have considered a simple two-period cake-eating consumption
model. This model is very parsimonious, but it is too restrictive to capture
some essential features of the climate change risk. In particular, the model
does not capture stock pollutant eﬀects. Moreover, this model considers an
additive risk. Yet, the climate change risk is typically a multiplicative risk because the future risk grows with the level of consumption today. Obviously,
there are many other eﬀects that should be accounted in a more realistic
climate change model.
Another research direction relates to our assumption that individual preferences are homogeneous: individuals have the same vNM utility function.
Although controversial in the social choice literature, this assumption is
prevalent in applied welfare economics. For instance, essentially all the literature on climate change that we are aware of assumes homogeneous utilities.
Yet, it is recognized that climate change can significantly modify the conditions of life on earth in the future. It thus seems reasonable to allow for the
possibility that the preferences of future generations may diﬀer from ours,
and it will be important to explore the impact of this diﬀerence on today’s
precautionary actions.

Appendix: The EDE case
In this appendix, we derive conditions so that consumption under Fleurbaey
(2010)’s equally distributed equivalent (EDE) is lower than under utilitarianism. Formally, using the FOCs (3) and (16), we want to show
0 ()−0 (−)
e
= 0 =⇒ 

e − ))0 (
e − )
 0 (())0 () − 0 ((
≤ 0 (17)
1
1
0 (−1 ( 2 (()) + 2 ((
e − ))))

We use the diﬃdence theorem (Gollier 2001, page 86-87). More precisely,
we use a Lemma which is directly based on a necessity part of the diﬃdence theorem when applied to “small risks” in the sense of a second-order
approximation.
17

Lemma. (Gollier 2001) Let the problem:
e = 0 =⇒ 2 ()
e ≤ 0
for all ,
e 1 ()

(18)

Assume that there exists a scalar 0 such that 1 (0 ) = 2 (0 ) = 0 with
10 (0 ) 6= 0. Then, a necessary and suﬃcient for (18) for any “small” 
e
around 0 is
 0 (0 ) 00
 (0 )
(19)
200 (0 ) ≤ 20
1 (0 ) 1
We now simply apply this Lemma with 1 () = 0 () − 0 ( − ) and
2 () =

 0 (())0 () − 0 (( − ))0 ( − )

0 (−1 ( 12 (()) + 12 (( − ))))

Observe that under 0 = 2, we have 1 (0 ) = 2 (0 ) = 0. We then
easily obtain 10 (2) = −00 () 6= 0 and 100 (2) = −000 (). Moreover, we can
compute
0 ()2 00 (())
0
2 (2) = −
− 00 ()  0
0
 (())
and
200 (2) = 0 (())−2 [−20 (())0 ()00 (())00 () + 0 ()3 (00 (())2
−0 (()) 000 (())) −  0 (())2 000 ()]
Assuming () = (1 − )−1 1− with   0 and   0, we obtain
200 (2) 100 (2)
0 ()4
00 ()
() 00 ()2 () 000 ()
+
−
=
[
−2
]
20 (2) 10 (2)
()00 ()(−0 ()2 + ()00 ()) 0 ()
0 () 0 ()2 0 () 0 ()
Note that the sign of this last expression only depends on the utility function
() through the term into brackets. This term can be respectively positive
√
or negative for some utility functions (e.g., take respectively () =  + 
and () = 1 − 1(1 + )). However, if we assume () = (1 − )−1 1−
with  ∈ (0 1), it is immediate that the term into bracket is always equal
to zero. Therefore, the necessary and suﬃcient condition (19) provided by
the Lemma above is always satisfied “just” under Atkinsonian and CRRA
functions.
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g’(u)

g’’’(u)<0

g’’’(u)>0
0

u

Figure 1:
This figure illustrates that the conditions 0 ()  0, 00 ()  0 together
with 000 ()  0 for all   0 are mutually inconsistent.
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